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Abstract:  Earnings inequality in Great Britain has increased substantially over the 
last two decades at both the national and regional levels.  This paper examines the 
determinants of regional hourly earnings over the period 1976 to 1995 by estimating 
regional fixed-effects earnings equations.  Using panel dataset from the New Earnings 
Survey, individual-specific heterogeneity is controlled for, and superior estimates of 
the factors affecting regional earnings are obtained.  Increasing returns to skill, 
increasing industrial differentials, and increasing premiums for older workers are 
found to have contributed to increasing regional earnings inequality, and consequently 
rising earnings inequality at the national level.   
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Earnings inequality in Great Britain has increased substantially over the last two 
decades at both the national and regional levels.  Furthermore, the primary source of 
increasing inequality in the distribution of earnings has been increasing inequality 
within regions and not differences in average earnings between regions (Dickey, 
2001). 
 
In order to explain why the distributions of earnings within regions are becoming 
more unequal over time, this paper uses earnings data from the New Earnings Survey 
to investigate factors that influence the determination of earnings within the regions, 
and how these factors change over time.  Despite the significant interest in research 
literature on the issue of earnings inequality, there has been little analysis carried out 
at the regional level in Great Britain, and the important issue of the determinants of 
regional earnings has been largely ignored. 
 
However, one problem with the NES is that it is not rich in variables that are thought 
to determine wages, for example, human capital variables.  The consequence of using 
a limited list of control variables when specifying earnings equations is the possibility 
of bias arising in cross-section coefficients.  The use of panel data allows for the 
control of unobserved fixed effects that are especially important when using a dataset 
that is weak on personal characteristics.   
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This is achieved by the inclusion of individual fixed-effects which will reduce the 
omitted variable bias resulting from the limited list of control variables in the NES, 
and improve the precision of the estimates of regional earnings determinants. 
 
In section 2 theoretical issues concerning panel data estimation are discussed, 
specifically the reasons why a fixed-effects specification is appropriate when 
estimating earnings equations.  Section 3 outlines the two different fixed-effects 
specifications used in this paper.  The first specification is the classical fixed-effects 
model in which the coefficients are fixed over time.  The second specification is a 
fixed-effects model in which the coefficients are allowed to vary by period.  Section 4 
concludes. 
 
II. THEORETICAL ISSUES 
 
Fixed-effects and Random-effects models 
 
The use of panel data provides the means of controlling for the effects of missing or 
unobserved variables.  Omitted variables that are correlated with explanatory 
variables are a common econometric problem, and which cause least squares 
regression coefficients to be biased.  Panel data has the advantage that if repeated 
observations for a group of individuals are available, the effect of omitted variables 
can be eliminated and, therefore, least squares regressions provide unbiased and 
consistent coefficients under the assumption that these effects do not change through 
time or vary in a random manner. 
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The effects of omitted individual-specific variables can be treated in one of two ways; 
namely as either fixed constants over time or as random variables, thus leading to the 
fixed-effects and random-effects models respectively. 
 
The question of whether the individual-specifics should be treated as fixed or random 
depends on the situation to which the model applies and the inferences to be derived 
from it.  Two issues have been raised in the literature regarding whether the effects of 
individual-specific and time-specific variables should be treated as random or fixed 
for a linear static model; the efficiency of the estimates and the unbiasedness and 
consistency of the estimates.  The random-effects specification has been criticised by 
Mundlak (1978) because it ignores the possible correlation between the explanatory 
variables and the effects.  When all the explanatory variables are exogenous the 
covariance estimator is BLUE under the fixed-effects assumption and a consistent and 
unbiased estimator under the random-effects assumption even though it is not 
efficient when the number of years (T) is fixed.  When there are omitted individual 
attributes that are correlated with the included exogenous variables, the fixed-effects 
covariance estimates do not suffer from bias due to the omission of these individual 
attributes.  However, a GLS estimator for the random-effects model under the 
assumption of independence between the attributes and the explanatory variables will 
be biased.  If the effects are correlated with all the exogenous variables, a correctly 
formulated random-effects model will lead to the same covariance estimator as the 
fixed-effects model.  As a result, the fixed-effects model has gained more importance 
in empirical studies. 
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For the estimation of earnings equations using panel data it is important to take 
account of the permanent unobserved differences across individuals, and in these 
equations there will be a high probability of correlation between the individual 
heterogeneity and the explanatory variables.  Thus, a fixed-effects specification will 
be more appropriate as treating the individual heterogeneity as a random error 
component will result in biased and inconsistent estimates, whereas the fixed-effects 
estimator will be unbiased and consistent. 
 
III. SPECIFICATION OF THE FIXED-EFFECTS REGIONAL EARNINGS 
EQUATIONS 
 
In this paper panel data from the New Earnings Survey is used to investigate the 
determinants of regional earnings in Great Britain.  The NES provides the main 
source of information on the structure of earnings in Great Britain.  It is a sample 
survey of the earnings of employees in employment, and contains information on 
weekly earnings, hourly rates of pay and hours of work, as well as various employee 
characteristics such as age, occupation, industry, area and whether or not an 
individual is covered by a Wages Board or Council.   
 
Using individual earnings data from 1976, 1980, 1991 and 1995 earnings equations 
are estimated for the six broad regions of Great Britain; Greater London, the Rest of 
the South, the Midlands, the North, Wales and Scotland.  The analysis focuses on full-
time workers (defined as those that usually work 30 hours or more per week), as part-
 6
time workers are omitted due to the sampling frame used by the NES1.  The fixed-
effects earnings equations are a standard formulation of the Mincer-type model that 
controls for both unobserved heterogeneity and for time-specific effects: 
 
   ititittit uXy +++= αλβln      [1] 
 
where yit is hourly earnings; Xit is a vector of conditioning variables; uit is the 
disturbance associated with individual i at time t; βt is the vector of parameters to be 
estimated for period t; αi and λt are the coefficients on the individual-specific and 
time-specific dummy variables which allow for heterogeneous intercepts across 
                                                 
1 The sampling frame used by the NES makes the earnings information on part-time 
workers less than fully representative.  The NES is based largely on a 1% random 
sample of employees who are members of Pay As You Earn tax schemes, and 
comprises all those National Insurance numbers which end with a specified pair of 
digits.  The use of Inland Revenue records to locate the employees with the 
appropriate NI numbers means that the sample base is effectively restricted to those 
employees who are recorded in the tax office records.  The earnings threshold for the 
PAYE schemes will therefore have important implications for sample selection.  
Many of those excluded from the sample because their earnings fall below the income 
tax threshold include women with part-time jobs and a small proportion of young 
people.  Further, due to the increasing number of part-time females included in the 
NES who earn below the NI lower limit, the statistics on part-time females must be 
treated with caution (Bell, 1995).  As a result, only full-time employees are included 
in this analysis. 
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individuals and time.  The individual-specific effect can take account of unmeasured 
individual differences in earnings capabilities (e.g. education or application) 
providing these stay constant through time, and which cannot be identified in cross-
sectional studies but will appear instead in a composite error term (Bell and Ritchie, 
1996). 
 
Two different specifications of the above fixed-effects model are used to estimate the 
regional earnings equations.  The first specification is the classical fixed-effects model 
in which the coefficients of the explanatory variables are fixed over time.  Thus, only 
one vector of β parameters is estimated: 
 
        [2] itititit uXy +++= αλβ 'ln
 
In contrast, the second specification is a fixed-effects model in which the coefficients 
are allowed to vary by period.  In this specification, βt is a vector of parameters to be 
estimated for each period t: 
 
   ititittit uXy +++= αλβln      [3] 
 
For estimation purposes the difference in the two specifications is the way in which 
the data is arranged.  In the classical time-invariant fixed-effects model the 
explanatory variables are set up as a matrix, one for each time period, and then the 
variable matrices are stacked vertically: 
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In the time-varying fixed-effects model the coefficients for the explanatory variables 
are allowed to vary freely over the period.  The vector of β coefficients is therefore 
estimated for each time period.  This is achieved by stacking the X variable matrix 
block-diagonally.  The model is rewritten as: 
 
   iiiiTi uWJy ++= βα       [5] 
where  
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and JT is a T-vector of ones.  In this way the vector of β coefficients is estimated for 
each of the four sample years.  In both specifications αi is treated as a nuisance 
parameter that is eliminated by taking deviations from individual means.   
 
In the classical fixed-effects specification the model concentrates on differences 
within individuals.  It is explaining to what extent  differs from ity iy , and does not 
explain why iy  differs from jy .  The parametric assumptions about β impose that a 
change in  has the same (ceteris paribus) effect, whether it as a change from one 
period to another or a change from one individual to the other.  In the classical fixed-
x
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effects model the effect of is identified through individuals who change status over 
the period.  For example, the effect of being in a union is identified only through 
people that change union status over the sample period. 
x
 
In contrast, the time-varying fixed-effects model exploits all the observations in the 
sample, including those individuals who do not change status, and the estimation of 
coefficients for each time period means that the assumptions concerning β which 
impose that a change in  has the same ceteris paribus effect from one period to 
another no longer applies.  The more flexible specification therefore allows us to 
model not just the different premiums associated with the different determinants of 
earnings, but also how these premiums have changed over time.  Despite the existence 
of models that allow coefficients to vary over individuals, few authors have 
considered coefficients that vary over time.  Consequently, theoretical and applied 
research with time-varying coefficients is almost non-existent (Bell and Ritchie, 
1994). 
x
 
The explanatory variables included in the model are dummies for occupation, 
industry, sector, coverage by major collective agreement, regional migration, and age.  
For the time-varying fixed-effects model, following the specification of Bell and 
Ritchie (1996) the coefficients on age are restricted to be the same for all periods.  
Direct modelling of human capital in these equations is precluded as a result of the 
NES not including observations on education and experience.  In the absence of such 
variables previous research using the NES has used occupation and age variables as 
proxies for human capital (Bell, Rimmer and Rimmer, 1994).  The nine major groups 
of the Standard Occupation Classification are used for the occupation variable.  
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Similarly, for the industry variable, the industrial divisions are from the Standard 
Industrial Classification. 
 
The dependent variable is hourly earnings adjusted for overtime and the sample 
consists of full-time employees aged between 16 and 65 years with at least two 
observations in the dataset.  This is necessary as those with only one observation are 
lost when the transformation for individual heterogeneity is made.  In addition, the 
earnings data are deflated to the base year 1976 using the RPI. 
 
Fixed-effects regression results 
 
The estimates for the regional earnings equations using the classical fixed-effects 
model are shown in Table 1.  The results for the time-varying fixed-effects 
specification for 1976 and 1995 are shown in Tables 2 and 3.  The regional earnings 
equations were also estimated cross-sectionally for comparative reasons, and the 
cross-section results for 1976 and 1995 are shown in Tables 4 and 5. 
 
The time-invariant estimates for the occupation variable show that skilled workers do 
better in terms of earnings relative to other workers irrespective of region.  There is an 
earnings premium for workers in non-manual occupations compared to workers in 
manual occupations.  The time-varying estimates for the occupation variable further 
reveal that inter-occupational differentials have risen over time, with the earnings gap 
between high- and low-skilled workers increasing in all regions.   
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The time-varying estimates also show that occupational structure has become more 
important over time in explaining hourly earnings.  This changing impact of 
occupational structure on individual hourly earnings over the sample period will not 
be picked up by the classical fixed-effects model as it assumes that changes in 
occupation have the same ceteris paribus impact from one period to another. 
 
A comparison of the panel estimates and cross-section estimates produce qualitatively 
similar results, but the fixed-effects estimates are generally smaller than the cross-
section results.  The time-varying coefficients for occupation are lowest in 1976 and 
highest in 1995, with the time-invariant coefficients generally falling around midway 
between this range.  One reason for the difference in the size of the returns to 
occupation may be that non-manual occupations rely much more on “unmeasurable” 
characteristics, such as ability, personality and motivation.  If these characteristics 
remain constant over time this could explain the disparity between the cross-section 
and fixed-effects results.  Another reason may be education. Education is likely to 
produce an individual-specific element with occupation which will be transformed out 
by the fixed-effects model.  By not transforming out this effect the cross-section 
estimation may more accurately reflect the occupational returns due to the average 
individual.  On the other hand, the time-varying fixed-effects model produces a 
“pure” coefficient and therefore gives the return to an occupation allowing for any 
individual characteristics.  Thus, the cross-section estimation predicts overall returns 
to an occupation, whereas the time-varying fixed-effects specification is more 
appropriate for comparing occupational differences (Ritchie, 1995). 
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The effect of industry on individual hourly earnings shown by both the time-invariant 
and time-varying estimates broadly supports the cross-section estimates.  One striking 
difference, however, between the cross-section and time-varying fixed-effects 
estimates, however, is the coefficients for the industrial division banking, finance and 
insurance.  The cross-section results reveal an earnings premium for those individuals 
employed in this industry, particularly in Greater London.  In contrast, the fixed-
effects coefficients are mostly negative and significant.  Taking into account 
unobserved individual heterogeneity (i.e. the unmeasured differences between 
individuals, such as ability) therefore suggests that the earnings premium for workers 
in this industry reported by cross-section estimation may be a result of these workers 
being of higher than average ability rather than because there is a larger rent paid to 
these workers in this particular industry.  The use of panel estimates, however, avoids 
the problem of unobserved individual heterogeneity being wrongly ascribed to the 
control variables. 
 
The time-invariant fixed-effects estimates suggest that industrial structure has a 
greater impact on earnings in the northern regions of Great Britain that are 
traditionally considered manufacturing regions compared to the southern regions that 
are relatively more concentrated in service industries.  The time-varying results 
further reveal that industrial structure has become more important in explaining 
hourly earnings over the period. 
 
The time-invariant fixed-effects estimates for the sector variable indicate that being 
employed in either a public corporation or local government has a largely positive 
impact on individual hourly earnings, whereas employment in central government has 
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a negative effect on earnings.  The time-varying results further highlight a downward 
trend in the sector coefficients, implying that the public sector premium has declined 
over the period.  This is particularly true for workers in public corporations. 
 
A comparison of the time-invariant and the time-varying fixed-effects coefficients 
show that the time-invariant estimates are generally smaller than the time-varying 
estimates, and both fixed-effects estimates are smaller than the cross-section estimates 
for the sector variable. 
 
Rees and Shah (1992) and Bell and Ritchie (1994) also found a public sector premium 
in the hourly wage rate.  Rees and Shah argue that public sector employees work 
significantly fewer hours, which could produce a private sector premium if the 
difference in hours is not recognised.   
 
The age variable is specified as a set of dummy variables that allows for a very 
flexible specification of the age-earnings profile.  For the time-varying fixed-effects 
model, only one set of coefficients for age is estimated.  Consequently, the 
coefficients for age are time-invariant in both fixed-effects specifications.   
 
Both fixed-effects estimates show that there is an earnings premium for workers in the 
prime age band of 36-50 years.  This is consistent with the cross-section results and 
the fixed-effects estimates of Bell and Ritchie (1996).  In addition, all age groups do 
well relative to the very young.  In all six regions workers under the age of 20 years 
are particularly disadvantaged.  
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The age-earnings profiles of the different regions display a similar pattern.  Earnings 
increase with age until they peak in the 36-45 age range and then begin to decline as 
workers get older.   One regional difference in the age-earnings profiles revealed by 
the time-varying estimates is that earnings peak in the 41-45 age group in Greater 
London but for the other regions earnings peak in the 36-40 age band.  Another 
regional difference is that individuals aged between 19 and 30 years in Greater 
London earn lower wages (relative to prime age workers) compared to workers aged 
between 19 and 30 years in the rest of the country.   
 
A comparison of the two fixed-effects estimates for the age variable show that the 
coefficients are very similar in value and statistical significance, and also the patterns 
highlighted by the fixed-effects estimates are similar to the cross-section results.  
Cross-section estimates further show that the age premiums for prime-age workers 
increased over the period, so that by 1995 younger workers were even more 
disadvantaged relative to prime-age workers (aged between 36 and 50 years). 
 
In the classical fixed-effects model the effect of unionism is identified only through 
those individuals who change union status over time.  The time-invariant estimates 
indicate that the effect of union coverage on individual hourly earnings is positive for 
all six regions.  Union coverage has the greatest impact on earnings in the North and 
the least impact in the Rest of the South. 
 
The fixed-effects specification of the earnings equations that allows the coefficients to 
vary over time further shows that the size of the union effect varies considerably over 
the period.  Bell and Ritchie (1996) suggest that estimates of the union effect may be 
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sensitive to the measurement period, and given the legislative changes concerning 
trade unions over the last 25 years significant variation in the union effect is to be 
expected. 
 
As expected the fixed-effects estimates of the union differential are lower than cross-
section estimates.  This is a result of allowing for individual heterogeneity.    In 
addition, the classical fixed-effects model gives lower estimates of the union 
differential than the time-varying fixed-effects model.  The difference between the 
fixed-effects and cross-section estimates are consistent with the results of Andrews, 
Bell and Upward (1998) who find fixed-effects of a 2% union coverage differential in 
both 1978 and 1985 and cross-section estimates of 4% for the same years.  Booth 
(1995) states that panel estimates give much lower estimates of the union effect than 
cross-sections, with the latter generally seeming to be twice as large (Bell and Ritchie, 
1996). 
 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper has examined the determinants of regional hourly earnings over the period 
1976 to 1995 by estimating regional fixed-effects earnings equations.  The presence 
of unmeasured differences between individuals raises the possibility of bias arising in 
cross-section estimates.  However, using the NES panel dataset this individual-
specific heterogeneity can be controlled for, and superior estimates of the factors 
affecting regional earnings can be obtained.   
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Two specifications of the fixed-effects model were used to estimate the regional 
earnings equations. The classical time-invariant fixed-effects model and a time-
varying specification that allowed the vector of coefficients to be estimated for each 
time period.  The allowance for individual-specific heterogeneity goes some way to 
making up for the lack of personal and educational variables in the NES, and 
specifying fixed-effects earnings equations allows us to take into account 
characteristics which are constant over time but which are essentially unmeasurable. 
 
The importance of allowing for individual-specific heterogeneity is shown in the 
fixed-effects results.  The cross-section and fixed-effects estimates are qualitatively 
similar but the scale of the estimates is different.  Both fixed-effects specifications 
generally produce smaller coefficients than those obtained from cross-section 
estimation.  In general, the regional fixed-effects results support the findings of the 
cross-section estimates.  Increasing returns to skill (as proxied by occupation and 
age), increasing industrial differentials over time, and increasing premiums for older 
workers have all contributed to increasing regional earnings inequality, and 
consequently rising earnings inequality at the national level.   
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TABLE 1  
Classical Fixed-Effects Results 
 
 Greater 
London 
Rest of 
the South 
The 
Midlands 
The 
North 
Wales Scot-
land 
Occupation       
Managers & administrators 0.089** 0.146** 0.146** 0.145** 0.051** 0.162** 
Professional occupations 0.066** 0.097** 0.080** 0.090** 0.023 0.090** 
Associate professional & technical 0.069** 0.058** 0.054** 0.071** 0.022 0083** 
Clerical & secretarial -0.057** -0.033** -0.038** -0.009** -0.084** -0.022* 
Personal & protective services -0.91** -0.038** -0.049** -0.041** -0.101** -0.043** 
Sales occupations -0.033* -0.012 -0.030* -0.001 -0.077** -0.039* 
Plant & machinery operatives -0.031* -0.021** -0.033** -0.005 -0.047** -0.013 
Other occupations -0.099** -0.070** -0.073** -0.032** -0.097** -0.051** 
Industry       
Agriculture, forestry & fishing 0.079 -0.021 -0.074* -0.008 -0.021 -0.075* 
Energy & water supply 0.038 0.094** 0.242** 0.183** 0.231** -0.129** 
Other mineral & ore extraction 0.035 0.006 0.017 0.066** 0.135** 0.036* 
Metal, vehicles & engineering 0.004 0.023* 0.025* 0.042** 0.064** 0.044** 
Construction -0.052* -0.020 -0.055** -0.022* -0.058* -0.020 
Distribution, catering & repairs -0.073** -0.076** -0.074** -0.089** -0.073** -0.069** 
Transport & communication -0.010 -0.030* -0.075** -0.052** -0.053 -0.063** 
Banking, finance & insurance 0.007 -0.014 -0.050** -0.028* -0.051 0.076** 
Other services -0.049** -0.035** -0.021 -0.038** -0.069* -0.068** 
Sector       
Public corporations 0.056** 0.017* 0.020* 0.011 0.019 0.041** 
Central government -0.039* -0.055** -0.039* -0.037** -0.054* 0.008 
Local government 0.031 0.001 0.030* -0.007 -0.047* 0.032* 
Age group       
17 – 18 -0.570** -0.538** -0.527** -0.503** -0.503** -0.522** 
19 – 20 -0.411** -0.322** -0.346** -0.289** -0.297** -0.300** 
21 – 22 -0.289** -0.217** -0.205** -0.162** -0.184** -0.188** 
23 – 24 -0.226** -0.152** -0.143** -0.122** -0.103** -0.112** 
25 – 26 -0.167** -0.108** -0.098** -0.082** -0.109** -0.096** 
27 – 30 -0.084** -0.051** -0.041** -0.040** -0.023 -0.038** 
36 – 40 0.046** 0.031** 0.021* 0.033** 0.015 0.026* 
41 – 45 0.065** 0.025* 0.023 0.035** 0.010 0.024 
46 – 50 0.054* 0.017 0.008 0.019 -0.019 0.009 
51 – 55 0.034 -0.025 -0.021 -0.018 -0.054 -0.026 
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56 – 60 -0.017 -0.078** -0.065* -0.068* -0.093 -0.069 
>60 -0.089 -0.145** -0.125** -0.137** -0.122 -0.128* 
       
Collective agreement 0.030** 0.023** 0.035** 0.039** 0.032** 0.025** 
Move -0.019 -0.041** -0.012 -0.003 -0.009 -0.055* 
       
Time dummy: 1980 0.541** 0.548** 0.537** 0.544** 0.533** 0.528** 
Time dummy: 1991 1.572** 1.529** 1.464** 1.477** 1.473** 1.484** 
Time dummy: 1995 1.743** 1.696** 1.634** 1.669** 1.677** 1.687** 
       
R2 0.917 0.923 0.924 0.926 0.931 0.928 
Notes: 
*      Significant at the 10% level. 
**    Significant at the 5% level. 
***  Significant at the 1% level. 
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TABLE 2 
Time-varying Fixed-Effects Results for 1976 
 
 Greater 
London 
Rest of 
the 
South 
The 
Midlands 
The 
North 
Wales Scot-
land 
Occupation       
Managers & administrators -0.016 -0.004 -0.011 -0.008 -0.039 0.030 
Professional occupations 0.002 0.017 -0.004 -0.007 -0.049 -0.015 
Associate professional & technical -0.009 -0.002 -0.001 -0.019 0.007 -0.007 
Clerical & secretarial -0.022 -0.033** -0.035** -0.016 -0.075** -0.026 
Personal & protective services -0.103** -0.074** -0.092** -0.067** -0.102** -0.069** 
Sales occupations -0.041 -0.051** -0.046* -0.040* -0.069 -0.068** 
Plant & machinery operatives 0.010 0.011 -0.016 0.029** -0.020 0.005 
Other occupations -0.015 -0.014 -0.012 0.007 -0.074* 0.007 
Industry       
Agriculture, forestry & fishing 0.196 0.003 -0.052 0.009 -0.007 -0.043 
Energy & water supply -0.040 0.016 0.112** 0.065** 0.091* -0.013 
Other mineral & ore extraction 0.037 -0.002 0.017 0.046** 0.114** 0.032 
Metal, vehicles & engineering 0.026 0.013 0.028* 0.032** 0.055* 0.064** 
Construction -0.051* -0.028 -0.086** -0.016 -0.058 -0.012 
Distribution, catering & repairs -0.015 -0.040** -0.090** -0.084** -0.050 -0.034 
Transport & communication 0.002 -0.007 -0.061* -0.031 -0.062 -0.078** 
Banking, finance & insurance -0.088** -0.143** -0.150** -0.130** -0.199** -0.169** 
Other services -0.034 -0.035* -0.027 -0.034* -0.047 -0.094** 
Sector       
Public corporations 0.118** 0.038* 0.066** 0.052** 0.082** 0.101** 
Central government 0.034 -0.026 -0.041 -0.029 -0.071* 0.083** 
Local government 0.105** 0.041* 0.071** 0.020 0.042 0.073** 
Age group       
17 – 18 -0.575** -0.550** -0.546** -0.525** -0.508** -0.521** 
19 – 20 -0.401** -0.327** -0.350** -0.302** -0.294** -0.288** 
21 – 22 -0.289** -0.218** -0.212** -0.174** -0.176** -0.177** 
23 – 24 -0.214** -0.152** -0.139** -0.125** -0.101** -0.096** 
25 – 26 -0.155** -0.105** -0.094** -0.086** -0.098** -0.081** 
27 – 30 -0.074** -0.048** -0.036** -0.039** -0.016 -0.027* 
36 – 40 0.037** 0.023** 0.018* 0.026** 0.006 0.007 
41 – 45 0.049** 0.013 0.018 0.023* -0.007 -0.008 
 24
46 – 50 0.035 0.003 0.005 0.006 -0.037 -0.031 
51 – 55 0.024 -0.036 -0.017 -0.026 -0.077 -0.074* 
56 – 60 -0.017 -0.082** -0.056 -0.068* -0.125* -0.122** 
>60 -0.074 -0.136** -0.103* -0.128** -0.150* -0.183** 
       
Collective agreement 0.049** 0.041** 0.035** 0.043** 0.039* 0.033** 
Move -0.023 -0.040** -0.042 -0.025 -0.083* -0.183** 
       
R2 0.777 0.784 0.789 0.788 0.783 0.787 
N 31088 57671 33871 53216 9039 22403 
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TABLE 3 
Time-varying Fixed-effects Results for 1995 
 
 Greater 
London 
Rest of 
the 
South 
The 
Midlands 
The 
North 
Wales Scot-
land 
Occupation       
Managers & administrators 0.203** 0.264** 0.275** 0.270** 0.188** 0.278** 
Professional occupations 0.207** 0.208** 0.223** 0.216** 0.174** 0.246** 
Associate professional & technical 0.196** 0.163** 0.163** 0.174** 0.166** 0.203** 
Clerical & secretarial -0.054* 0.021* 0.016 0.022* -0.017 0.023 
Personal & protective services -0.075** 0.011 -0.016 0.013 -0.021 -0.004 
Sales occupations 0.012 0.065** 0.048* 0.048** -0.002 0.029 
Plant & machinery operatives -0.087** -0.054* -0.056** -0.048** -0.008 -0.042* 
Other occupations -0.139** -0.113** -0.101** -0.082** -0.103** -0.124** 
Industry       
Agriculture, forestry & fishing -0.073 -0.107** -0.140** -0.082* -0.100 -0.125* 
Energy & water supply 0.117** 0.142** 0.281** 0.254** 0.345** 0.176** 
Other mineral & ore extraction 0.073* 0.043* 0.006 0.105** 0.139** 0.073* 
Metal, vehicles & engineering -0.033 0.017 0.024 0.025* 0.039 0.025 
Construction -0.085* -0.061** -0.051* -0.058** -0.098* -0.027 
Distribution, catering & repairs -0.115** -0.138** -0.095** -0.138** -0.084* -0.130** 
Transport & communication -0.046* -0.035* -0.091** -0.054** -0.023 -0.071** 
Banking, finance & insurance 0.094** 0.009 -0.025 0.007 0.032 -0.024 
Other services -0.049* -0.062** -0.001 -0.052** -0.110** -0.047* 
Sector       
Public corporations 0.070** -0.006 0.052* -0.050* -0.038 0.060* 
Central government -0.079** -0.035* -0.055* -0.027 0.013 -0.022 
Local government 0.005 0.026 0.005 0.015 0.117** 0.026 
       
Collective agreement 0.059** 0.026** 0.048** 0.035** 0.036* 0.030* 
Move -0.012 0.023 dropped 0.055 0.071 0.017 
Time dummy 1.708** 1.645** 1.561** 1.604** 1.598** 0.653** 
       
R2 0.777 0.784 0.789 0.788 0.783 0.787 
N 31088 57671 33871 53216 9039 22403 
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TABLE 4 
 
Cross-section Results for 1976 
 
 
 Greater 
London 
Rest of 
the 
South 
The 
Midlands 
The 
North 
Wales Scot-
land 
Occupation       
Managers & administrators 0.320** 0.254** 0.228** 0.224** 0.229** 0.256** 
Professional occupations 0.379** 0.381** 0.338** 0.334** 0.315** 0.314** 
Associate professional & technical 0.351** 0.347** 0.270** 0.289** 0.319** 0.311** 
Clerical & secretarial 0.054** 0.034** 0.011 0.011 0.035* 0.024* 
Personal & protective services -0.040* -0.003 -0.040* -0.048** 0.047 -0.048* 
Sales occupations 0.153** 0.057** 0.068** 0.053** 0.053 0.008 
Plant & machinery operatives -0.044** -0.034** -0.038** -0.041** -0.029* -0.055** 
Other occupations -0.115** -0.094** -0.095** -0.101** -0.107** -0.100** 
Industry       
Agriculture, forestry & fishing -0.092 -0.056* -0.066* -0.026 -0.069 -0.049 
Energy & water supply 0.071* 0.135** 0.108** 0.168** 0.094** 0.145** 
Other mineral & ore extraction 0.012 0.063** 0.043** 0.145** 0.133** 0.089** 
Metal, vehicles & engineering -0.035* 0.049** 0.047** 0.072** 0.055* 0.091** 
Construction -0.058** -0.086** -0.074** -0.010 -0.103** -0.014 
Distribution, catering & repairs -0.050** -0.101** -0.168** -0.127** -0.193** -0.131** 
Transport & communication -0.005 0.032* -0.006 0.031* -0.071* -0.014 
Banking, finance & insurance 0.144** 0.061** 0.045** 0.082** -0.037 0.043* 
Other services 0.105** 0.081** 0.094** 0.144** 0.047 0.069** 
Sector       
Public corporations 0.123** 0.050** 0.078** 0.058** 0.119** 0.073** 
Central government 0.086** 0.025* 0.004 -0.006 0.057* 0.038* 
Local government 0.141** 0.163** 0.186** 0.133** 0.141** 0.138** 
Age group       
16 – 20 -0.469** -0.430** -0.409** -0.439** -0.412** -0.421** 
21 – 25 -0.220** -0.195** -0.149** -0.168** -0.163** -0.153** 
26 – 30 -0.078** -0.061** -0.042** -0.069** -0.079** -0.046** 
31 – 35 -0.028* -0.021* 0.004 -0.027* -0.021 -0.006 
41 – 45 -0.006 -0.011 0.004 -0.021* -0.033 -0.008 
46 – 50 -0.016 -0.011 -0.027* -0.035** -0.027 -0.038* 
51 – 55 -0.025* -0.047** -0.044** -0.076** -0.029 -0.045** 
56 – 60 -0.086** -0.083** -0.064** -0.104** -0.078** -0.096** 
 27
61 – 65 -0.178** -0.149** -0.149** -0.181** -0.139** -0.143** 
Institutions       
Collective agreement 0.235** 0.154** 0.120** 0.134** 0.080* 0.166** 
Wages boards and councils 0.012 -0.053* -0.060* -0.054* -0.192** -0.033 
No coverage 0.291** 0.159** 0.108** 0.133** 0.063 0.162** 
Gender 0.223** 0.242** 0.251** 0.263** 0.256** 0.279** 
Move -0.046** 0.091** 0.017 0.049** 0.069 0.129** 
Constant 0.027 -0.023 0.003 -0.013 0.039 -0.050 
       
R2 0.422 0.462 0.463 0.463 0.466 0.467 
N 11092 17437 10795 18747 3192 7795 
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TABLE 5 
 
Cross-section Results for 1995 
 
 
 Greater 
London 
Rest of 
the 
South 
The 
Midlands 
The 
North 
Wales Scot-
land 
Occupation       
Managers & administrators 0.523** 0.530** 0.520** 0.488** 0.491** 0.511** 
Professional occupations 0.561** 0.561** 0.594** 0.596** 0.587** 0.648** 
Associate professional & technical 0.456** 0.328** 0.304** 0.299** 0.315** 0.359** 
Clerical & secretarial 0.051* 0.041** 0.027* 0.004 0.022 0.038* 
Personal & protective services -0.049* -0.032* -0.034* -0.046** -0.020 -0.017 
Sales occupations 0.130** 0.128** 0.137** 0.106** 0.083* 0.094** 
Plant & machinery operatives -0.171** -0.132** -0.080** -0.098** -0.060* -0.101** 
Other occupations -0.254** -0.221** -0.207** -0.215** -0.201** -0.238** 
Industry       
Agriculture, forestry & fishing -0.441* -0.214** -0.156** -0.176** -0.226* -0.222** 
Energy & water supply 0.172** 0.194** 0.236** 0.269** 0.327** 0.252** 
Other mineral & ore extraction -0.008 0.088** 0.060** 0.152** 0.223** 0.103** 
Metal, vehicles & engineering -0.103** 0.014 0.062** 0.041** 0.091** 0.051** 
Construction -0.206** -0.143** -0.049* -0.067** -0.124** -0.074** 
Distribution, catering & repairs -0.241** -0.202** -0.119** -0.190** -0.235** -0.253** 
Transport & communication -0.069** -0.009 -0.007 -0.007 -0.004 -0.018 
Banking, finance & insurance 0.167** 0.074** 0.096** 0.074** -0.076* 0.021 
Other services -0.076** -0.117** -0.012 -0.049** -0.075* -0.050* 
Sector       
Public corporations 0.037 -0.066** -0.019 -0.070** -0.115* -0.032 
Central government -0.079** 0.044** 0.090** 0.068** 0.110** 0.025 
Local government 0.037* 0.122** 0.125** 0.138** 0.160** 0.104** 
Age group       
16 – 20 -0.531** -0.486** -0.481** -0.465** -0.488** -0.488** 
21 – 25 -0.273** -0.262** -0.225** -0.231** -0.238** -0.211** 
26 – 30 -0.114** -0.114** -0.095** -0.098** -0.071** -0.086** 
31 – 35 -0.034* -0.035** -0.020 -0.030** 0.005 -0.017 
41 – 45 0.019 -0.014 0.014 0.013 0.024 0.001 
46 – 50 0.018 -0.011 0.013 0.013 0.007 0.012 
51 – 55 -0.040* -0.050** -0.030* -0.014 -0.020 -0.004 
56 – 60 -0.086** -0.113** -0.054** -0.061** -0.016 -0.053* 
 29
61 – 65 -0.142** -0.209** -0.184** -0.162** -0.075 -0.105** 
       
Collective agreement -0.074** -0.062** -0.074** -0.054** -0.083** -0.039** 
Gender 0.154** 0.184** 0.203** 0.179** 0.186** 0.186** 
Move -0.037* 0.096** 0.061** 0.071** 0.033 0.145** 
Constant 2.120** 1.893** 1.730** 1.793** 1.748** 1.791** 
       
R2 0.460 0.495 0.498 0.503 0.523 0.562 
N 11513 22667 12943 19292 3354 7687 
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